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A. J. Maclntosh*

Corporate Governance and
Minority Rights

I. Introduction
Anglo-American corporate law has developed on the premise that
ordinarily the majority is entitled to rule. Nevertheless, the courts
have recognized the dangers in permitting tyranny by the majority
and have given relief in cases where they believed the majority was
clearly abusing its powers. Courts have had little difficulty in doing
this where it was clear that the majority was practising fraud in the
sense that it was appropriating to itself property or benefits which,
in the view of the courts, belonged to the corporation or, as it was
sometimes put, to the body of shareholders as a whole. However,
the courts have had much greater difficulty in dealing with cases
where the majority was not committing a "fraud", but, rather, was
causing the company to pursue a course of action because of
interests extraneous to their position as shareholders. So far, our
courts have failed to develop a coherent set of principles which may
be applied to determine when the power of the majority should be
restrained in such circumstances, and the result is that it is very
difficult to predict what limitations courts will place on the power of
majorities.
Courts normally have allowed the majority to settle the direction
a corporation should take on the ground that the shareholders are the
best judges of their own interests and, accordingly, their business
judgment and that of the directors they elect is to be preferred to that
of the courts. This is a sensible principle in cases where the
shareholders have a mutuality of interest, but it ceases to have the
same persuasive force when such a mutuality of interest does not
exist. In such cases, the course being followed by a corporation may
be dictated by interests which are peculiar to some of the
shareholders, and which may be contrary to the interests of the
corporation. As more and more public corporations become
controlled by a dominant shareholder, who either holds a majority
of the shares or sufficient shares to control the proxy machinery, the
relations of majorities and minorities become increasingly important
*Of Blake, Cassels and Graydon, Toronto.

Corporate Governance and Minority Rights 43

both for the corporations and society. In practice, large corporations
today are effectively controlled by those who are in control of the
proxy machinery and thus are able to select the directors and, more
importantly, the management of the corporations. In today's
industrial society, business is so complex that it is often difficult to
determine the wisdom of particular decisions without full access to
all relevant information. Thus, management is able, in most
corporations, to operate the business with very little in the way of
effective supervision. Its unique access to the information necessary
to make sensible judgments truly makes it, in a sense, king of all it
surveys. Thus, it is vitally important to the corporation that the
directors and management serve its interest, rather than their own.
As the modern corporation in a private enterprise society is the
primary means of organizing economic activity and marshalling the
finances necessary to do so, the operation of the corporate system is
not only of interest to its shareholders but has very important
implications for society. Although it is now recognized that a
corporation may pursue objectives which are not limited to the
earning of a profit for its shareholders, it is still recognized that this
is its primary objective;1 the pursuit of profit is generally recognized
to be the motivating factor in its operations. This modem view
differs little from the view expressed in Dodge v. Ford Motor
Company, 2 where it was said that "a business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders.
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end, the
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to
the reduction of profits or to the non-distribution of profits among
shareholders in order to devote them to other purposes." Although
that principle has been extended to permit the corporations to
engage in activities which are not primarily directed to profitmaking, the concept that the corporation exists for the principal
purpose of shareholder gain is still one that commands almost
universal recognition and is a basic premise of a private enterprise
system. Accordingly, when those in control of a corporation cause it
to engage in transactions motivated by their own particular interests,
rather than by any desire to enhance the gains of the shareholders,
1. Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, Tentative Draft No. I of the
American Law Institute (Philadelphia) 1982, at p. 17.
2. Dodge v. FordMotor Company 204 Mich. 459, at p. 507.
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they are causing the corporation to depart from its fundamental
objective. Once that happens, the power of the majority to direct the
affairs of the corporation should be questioned and curbed, not only
in the interests of the particular shareholders involved, but in the
interest of the system. If the corporation is to continue to play the
cardinal role it now does in the private enterprise system, it is
essential that shareholders be treated equitably and that their
interests not be sacrificed to those of the majority. Otherwise,
confidence in the system may be undermined and it will be a much
less effective way of organizing resources for commercial purposes.
Although the courts have acted to curb the most flagrant abuses of
power by majorities, the movement in the United Kingdom and
Canada has been painfully slow. Consequently, the development of
adequate remedies by the courts has been supplemented, particularly in recent years, by statutory changes intended to afford greater
protection for minority rights. These changes have made some
substantive alterations in the law and have also empowered the
courts to relieve a protesting shareholder from the crushing burden
of costly litigation. The statutory reforms have relied heavily on the
experience in the United States with regard to adopting the appraisal
remedy, which gives a dissenting shareholder a right, in effect, to
withdraw from the corporation if he is dissatisfied with a
fundamental alteration in his rights or in its affairs. This was
thought to be an effective way of protecting minorities in many
situations while allowing majority control to prevail, and to ensure a
satisfactory balance when coupled with an enlarged oppression
remedy. In making these reforms, the legislatures have continued to
rely heavily on the litigious process to provide a remedy. Despite
these statutory and judicial initiatives, it is questionable whether an
appropriate result has been achieved. As the differences between the
rights conferred by constitutions and the rights actually enjoyed all
too frequently demonstrate, it is vitally important that conferred
rights be real rights in the sense that they can be practically
enforced. By this standard, the existing system of protecting
shareholders' rights falls far short of the ideal, as they are not easily
enforceable and sometimes illusory, and the result is often that a
determined majority may obtain an unfair advantage.
The main cornerstones of the protection afforded to shareholders
under the existing common law and the statutory law consist largely
of:
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(a) a requirement that directors shall not participate in decisions
when they have conflicts of interest, so that decisions will be
taken by independent directors;
(b) an obligation of directors to account when they obtain
advantages which the courts regard as properly belonging to the
corporation;
(c) an appraisal remedy for dissenting shareholders enabling
them to withdraw when fundamental changes are made;
(d) the ability of the court to give relief when it finds that the
business of the corporation is being carried on or the powers of its
directors are being exercised in a manner which is oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of
shareholders; and
(e) the ability of the courts to require majorities to act
appropriately by expanding the common law as to the duties of
directors and to impose fiduciary obligations on those exercising
control over corporations.
Although the legislative and judicial developments of recent
years have vastly improved the lot of the minority, there is still a
substantial opportunity for abuse. This is particularly true of the
relations between a parent and its subsidiary, where the subsidiary
and parent carry on business with one another and where the
management of the subsidiary is selected by the parent. It is also
true of transactions involving a corporation and its dominant
shareholder. Many of these transactions, and particularly those
which are out of the ordinary course of business, are so complex
that intensive investigation is needed to determine whether or not
they are fair to the corporations involved. Corporate reorganizations
are also, on occasion, matters of infinite complexity, and,
commendable as the legislative attempts to provide the shareholder
with adequate disclosure have been, the result, all too frequently, is
that the average shareholder is confused and bewildered by the
volumes of explanations showered upon him. Even when he
completely understands the transaction, he will find, as any number
of proceedings before securities commissions amply demonstrate,
that there are almost as many opinions as to the fairness of a
transaction as there are fiscal agents. Thus, the task of a shareholder
in even obtaining the necessary information and expertise to form a
reasoned judgment about such transactions is not a simple one.
The existence of an independent board of directors can, and
undoubtedly does, provide a significant protection for the interests
of minorities. However, it must be recognized that more than
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apparent independence is necessary to secure this protection
because it requires an independent spirit to assume what may be the
heavy burden of opposing the will of the majority. It is certainly
possible to find corporations with a quiescent board ready to
approve what the dominant shareholder wishes. Courts have
recognized that it is sometimes asking too much of human nature to
expect disinterested directors to view with the necessary objectivity
the actions of colleagues whom they respect and with whom they
have close ties. 3 Thus, this safeguard may prove inadequate.
It is no easy task to arrive at an appropriate balance between the
rights of minorities and those of majorities, as there is a danger in
the tyranny of the minority as well as in the tyranny of the majority.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the existing situation is not
satisfactory and that further changes are needed if the system is to
work satisfactorily. An attempt will be made to demonstrate some
of the inadequacies of the present system and to suggest some
possible changes. Attention will be focussed on the legislative
approach represented by the Canada Business Corporations Act, as
4
it is fairly representative of the Canadian legislative reform.
II. Liabilitiesof Directors
The role of the director in ensuring that the manner in which a
corporation is being operated is in the interests of the shareholders is
fundamental. It is sometimes argued that, in a large, complex
corporation, the director only serves the purpose of ratifying the
decisions of management. This undoubtedly is a great exaggeration
in the case of most corporations, and, where it is true, directors are
now running significant risks. Although courts are unlikely to
question business judgments, even though proved erroneous by
events, they are likely to fix a jaundiced eye on the director who
makes little or no attempt to carry out his duties or who clearly
serves interests other than those of the corporation. Directors have
the right to demand all the information necessary to make informed
decisions and to determine whether the actions of management are
in the interests of the corporation. Accordingly, they should be the
first line of defence with regard to the interests of the shareholders.
It is gratifying that our courts and legislatures are moving to impose
a high standard of fiduciary duty on those who are responsible for
3. Lasker v. Burkes 567 F. (2d) 1208 at p. 1212.
4. S.C. 1974-5, c. 33.
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the affairs of corporations and that they have the power to see that
they are managed with due regard to the interests of all
shareholders.
The position of directors has been altered significantly in recent
years by legislative changes making it significantly easier for
minorities to bring actions and by a clearer and broader judicial
delineation of the circumstances in which directors are accountable
to corporations for breaches of their duty. The result is that a
minority shareholder with a reasonable case has a much better
opportunity to obtain relief when directors misuse their position
than he previously had. 5 In the past, one of the principal barriers
faced by a minority seeking relief was the danger that it would be
visited with crippling costs if it failed to succeed. Indeed, the
problem of funding litigation as such a complex transaction
progressed often constituted an effective bar which gave minorities
pause, even when they were assured that their chances of success
were excellent.
In the United States, the problem of funding was met by the use
of contingent fee litigation, which resulted in much easier access to
the courts, although the use of such fees has often been criticized
and such litigation, although it has its ardent defenders, still
provokes criticism. 6 Whatever the merits of this debate, there can
be no question that such actions in the United States often failed to
benefit the corporation or its shareholders because there was a
tendency for the real antagonists to reach private settlements that
maximized their own interests. For example, the American Law
Institute's analysis of the problem concluded that this could happen
because the plaintiff accepts a settlement well below the discounted
value "of a litigated outcome in return for the agreement of the
individual defendants to approve a higher award of attorneys'
fees," while "[t]he defendants may obtain covert reimbursement
'7
. . of any damages they contribute to the settlement fund."
Lately, it may be that the balance of advantage in the United States
has swung significantly in favour of the defendants, as the courts
have tended to accept the decisions of boards to terminate actions
because the board believed they were not in the corporation's best
interests. It is interesting that the institute concluded it could neither
5. Ibid, s. 232.
6. Principles of Corporate Governance and Structures, supra, pp. 227-240.
7. Ibid, p. 226.
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endorse the derivative action nor, in the absence of experience with
other forms of enforcement, recommend its curtailment. Rather, its
thrust was to opt for a greater judicial oversight, and in this it
adopted the same route as the Canadian legislative reform. 8
Section 232 of the Canada Business Corporations Act provides
that a complainant may apply to the court for leave to bring an
action on behalf of the corporation for the purpose of conducting an
action on behalf of the body corporate. No action may be brought
unless the complainant has given reasonable notice to the directors
of its intention to apply to the court for such an order if the directors
do not bring an action and the court is satisfied that the complainant
is acting in good faith and it is in the interests of the corporation for
the action to be brought. Section 233 gives the court wide powers to
supervise the conduct of the legislation and, most importantly, a
power to require the corporation to pay reasonable fees incurred by
the complainant. This power is sufficiently wide to permit the court
to require the payment of fees from time to time as they are
incurred, so that the plaintiff is not faced with the expense of
funding lengthy litigation. Thus, the difficulties which were placed
in the way of a minority shareholder by the rule in Foss v.
Harbottle9 were swept away, and in meritorious cases at least some
assurance was given that the shareholder would not be forced to pay
substantial legal costs. It is to be hoped that the Canadian courts will
follow the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Moir v.
Wallerstiner'° and hold that shareholders acting reasonably in the
commencement of a derivative suit, which they must be deemed to
do if the court gives its approval, will be entitled to be compensated
for costs, whatever the result of the action. Unfortunately, section
233 does not confer any specific power to require the corporation to
pay other expenses of such litigation, such as experts' fees. Often,
such litigation requires the investigation and evaluation of involved
transactions, which can prove time-consuming and expensive. A
court might require a corporation to pay such expenses under its
general power to make orders, but might believe that the specific
power to award costs implied a legislative intent to confine such
awards to legal fees. Accordingly, it is regrettable that a specific
right to require such a payment was not included in section 233.
However, section 233 does give the court the power to direct that a
8. Ibid, p. 298 et seq.
9. (1843) 2Hare461.
10. [1975] 1 All E.R. 849.
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recovery obtained in such an action may be paid to former security
holders. This recognizes the problem created by the common law
rule that the right to recover as a result of a director's failure to
perform his duty rested with the corporation; the result was that the
recovery, after years of litigation, often benefitted the current
shareholders, rather than those who had suffered as a result of the
wrongful act. The power of the court to give directions for the
conduct of the action avoids the problems encountered with
contingent fee actions, in which the interests of the shareholders
bringing the action may be preferred to those of all shareholders
when settlements are made.
The duties to be exercised by directors and officers have been
codified by providing that such persons must:
(a) act honestly and in good faith, with a view to the best interests
of the corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent
person would exercise in comparable circumstances."
Whether these changes enlarged the common law duties as much as
the furor created at the time of their introduction would have one
think is questionable. Certainly, the draftsmen did not believe they
were making any fundamental change in the general duty of loyalty
and good faith, stating that the section was "simply an attempt to
distill the effect of a massive case law illustrating the fiduciary
principles governing the position of directors." 12 The draftsmen did
suggest that the language would have the effect of eliminating the
so-called collateral purpose or abuse of power doctrine which courts
had used to restrict what they regarded as an improper use of the
powers conferred on directors; for example, courts had used this
doctrine to prevent directors from exercising their power to issue
shares to maintain control of a company. 13 This doctrine had
resulted in considerable confusion as to the cases in which courts
could interfere; the draftsmen believed it desirable to simplify the
test so that the real question was whether the decision was an honest
one, made in good faith and with a view to the best interests of the
corporation. The draftsmen did believe that they were increasing the
duty of care by requiring that a director should exercise the care,
11. C.B.C.A.,supra, s. 117.
12. Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, Vol. 1, p. 81.
13. Hogg v. CramphornLtd., [1967] Ch. 254; Bamford v. Bamford (1969) 1 All
E.R. 969.
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diligence, and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise
in comparable circumstances. 14 It was thought, as a result of
decisions such as Re: City Equitable Fire Insurance Company, that
a director was previously required only to demonstrate the degree of
care, skill, and diligence that could reasonably be expected of him
having regard to his experience. 15 It may be questionable whether,
in practice, a court would effectively judge a director by a lesser
standard than that adopted, at least in modern times, or whether a
counsel, acting for a director, would plead that, having regard to the
experience of his client, he should be expected to have less skill
than a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable
circumstances.
The duties imposed on directors by section 117 are very general
in their scope and their actual scope will depend upon the attitude of
the courts. The legislation does free the courts of some earlier
self-imposed limitations and permits them to impose more rigorous
standards than they did in the past. Nevertheless, as in most cases,
the general principles established by section 117, and particularly
those relating to good faith, merely repeat statements in our
jurisprudence; the positions established by the courts are likely to be
maintained, save where it is obvious that the legislative intent was
to effect a change. Courts have been notoriously loath to interfere
with the business judgment of directors, and it is unlikely that the
legislative changes will alter this judicial attitude towards decisions
which they believe, however mistakenly, were entered into with a
view to the benefit of the corporation. The major developments may
be expected in the field of the fiduciary duties of directors, where
courts recently have tended to enlarge the obligations of directors
and officers, and it is in this area that the problem of minority rights
is most likely to arise.
Anglo-Canadian courts have had very little difficulty in dealing
with cases where a director has made a secret profit or has had a
clear conflict of interest resulting in a preference of his own interest
to that of the corporation. Unfortunately, they have failed to
enunciate a set of coherent rules establishing the extent of the
fiduciary obligations of directors, with the result that it was and is
very difficult to forecast what a court might do from case to case.
This is rather unfortunate, as the courts had, over a period of
14. Proposals for a New Corporations Law, supra, p. 83.
15. Re City Equitable Fire InsuranceCompany, [1921] Ch. 425.
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hundreds of years, developed rules relating to trustees and agents
which could very well have served as a basis for clearer guidelines
for the responsibility of directors charged with the management of
the property and affairs of a corporation. Thus, Lord Chancellor
King, in Keech v. Sanford,16 ruled that a trustee might not acquire a
lease but must hold it for his beneficiary, notwithstanding that the
landlord refused to renew to the beneficiary and the trustee had
acted in perfectly good faith. Thus, the ambit of the duty did not
depend on loss to the trust or the acquisition of a benefit by the
trustee at the expense of the trust or on whether the trust could
acquire the opportunity. The trustee was not entitled to hold the
lease in any event. The objective of the courts was to ensure that
trustees were not placed in the way of temptation in the exercise of
their duties and to avoid enquiries by courts where it would be
almost impossible to determine whether the trustee had served his
legal master or himself. 17
Much time was devoted by courts and commentators to
examining the differences in the functions carried out by directors
and trustees. These distinctions served only to hamper the
development of a rule based on what cannot be denied - the
fiduciary position of directors. The rules as to directors' obligations
of good faith are not dependent on their position as trustees but,
rather, on their position as fiduciaries of whom courts of equity have
consistently demanded high standards of good faith.1 8 Thus, Lord
Upjohn, in a case involving trustees, said that "the relevant rule of
decision of this case is the fundamental rule of equity that a person
in a fiduciary position must not make a profit out of his trust which
is part of the wider rule that a trustee must not place himself in a
position where his duty and his interest are in conflict."' 19 This is a
point which was put repeatedly, by Mr. Justice Kellock and Mr.
Justice Rand, to counsel for the directors during the argument in
Zwicker v. Stanbury.2 0 It is rather unfortunate that the judgment did
not clearly place the liability solely on this rule, rather than relying
on English authorities, such as Regal (Hastings)Ltd. v. Gulliver,21
16. Keech v. Sanford (1726), 25 E.R. 223.
17. Benson v. Heathorn, 62 E.R. 909, at p. 916.
18. Phipps v. Boardman, [1967] 2 A.C. 46, at p. 123; see also pp. 102, 103.
107, and 118.

19. Ibid, p. 103.
20. Zvicker v. Stanbury (1953) 2 S.C.R. 438.
21. Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1942] 1 All E.R. 378.
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to impose liability because the opportunity arose "by reason and in
course of their office as directors." If that had been done, some of
the difficulties would have been avoided which have arisen because
of the doctrine, often attributed to Regal, that the accountability of a
director depends upon showing that opportunities were appropriated
which arose by reason and in the course of one's execution of the
office of director. It may be questioned, as Dean Beck has done,
whether the judgments in the Regal case really justify such a narrow
approach. 22 Indeed, when one reads the judgments of all the law
lords, there is nothing to indicate that they intended to narrow the
accountability of fiduciaries or to negate the concept that directors
should have the responsibility of advancing the interests of the
corporation and, thus, prefer the corporation's interests to their
own.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Peso Silver Mines
v. Cropper,23 did, relying on Regal, make some comments which
can and have been construed as restricting the obligation of directors
to account to cases where it can be shown that the opportunity in
question was obtained by reason of and in the course of the
directors' execution of their office. In the Peso case, the directors of
Peso formed a private company to acquire some claims which they,
as Peso directors, had previously been offered, but had turned down
because Peso could not afford to acquire them. There was a finding
that all of the directors had acted in good faith in rejecting the offer,
with the result that the Supreme Court of Canada found that the
defendants were not accountable, as the opportunity had not been
obtained by reason of the fact that they were directors and were in
the course of their execution of that office. 24 Mr. Justice Cartwright
referred extensively to the judgments of Regal, concluding that he
agreed with the statement of Lord Russell that "having obtained
these shares by reason and only by reason of the fact that they were
directors of Regal and in the course of execution of that office,
[they] are accountable for the profits which they have made out of
them.' '25 Accordingly, it was held that, as there was a good faith
rejection of the claims by the Peso board, the purchase was not in
the course of the execution of the directors' office as such. The
difficulty with the decision is that no one really can determine
22.
23.
24.
25.

The Saga of Peso Silver Mines, 49 C.B.R., 80 at p. 107.
Peso Silver Mines v. Cropper(1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 1.
Peso, supra, p. 8.
Ibid, p. 7.
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whether directors might or might not have acquired the necessary
financing for the claims if they had been precluded from acquiring
the property for themselves. It leaves the opportunity open to
directors to acquire for themselves what they may have a duty to
acquire for the corporation, so long as, in their judgment, made
bona fide, the opportunity cannot be acquired for the corporation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Zwicker v. Stanbury, was
faced with a very similar problem and, in the circumstances of that
case, rejected the argument that directors could acquire a second
mortgage for themselves which the company was in no position to
repay, indicating that the directors had been motivated solely to
advance their own interests. 2 6 The motives of directors in rejecting
opportunities may not always be easy to ascertain.
It is submitted that turning the question on the bona fides of
directors places the court in a difficult position, as Lord Wright
indicated in the Regal case, where he said that "[t]he facts are
generally difficult to ascertain or are solely in the knowledge of the
person who is being charged, they are matters of surmise; they are
hypothetical because the enquiry is as to what would have been the
position if that party had not acted as he did, or what he might have
done if there had not been the temptation to seek its own advantage,
if, in short, interest had not conflicted with duty." 2 7 In many cases,
business transactions are infinitely complex, and it will be difficult,
if not impossible, for courts to ascertain whether directors did all
that could be done to secure the interests of the corporation if they
are free to pursue their own interests once a factual situation is
created where it can be said that they acted bona fide in turning from
a pursuit of the corporation's interests to a pursuit of their own.
In these circumstances, the decision of Canadian Aero Services
Limited v. O'Malley2 8 was a welcome initiative by a unanimous
Supreme Court to re-examine the governing principles for directors'
liability. The case is not so notable for what it actually decided as it
is for the approach taken in the judgment towards the Regal case.
The defendants were directors and officers of the plaintiff, which
was engaged in the business of geophysical exploration. The
defendants had spent some time in connection with an aerial
mapping project in Guyana. At a time when the negotiations for the
26. Zwicker v. Stanbury, supra, 448 at p. 450.
27. Regal, supra, p. 392.
28. Canadian Aero Services Limited v. O'Malley (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371;
(1974) S.C.R. 592.
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job were well advanced, the defendants retired, formed their own
company, and succeeded in obtaining the contract. The plaintiff
sought to recover the benefit of the corporate opportunity which it
had been developing, but its action failed at trial and in the Ontario
Court of Appeal because the benefit or advantage had not been
obtained "by reason and in the course of their office as directors."
The reasoning was that the defendants had not obtained any
confidential information, and, as they had resigned, they had not
obtained the opportunity in circumstances where they had a liability
to account. Laskin J., writing for the court, held that a director,
either secretly or without the approval of the company, could not
acquire any property or business advantage belonging to the
company or for which it had been negotiating.
The judgment repudiates the view of the Regal case taken by
Grant J. and the Court of Appeal, as Laskin said that it was a
mistake "to encase the principle stated and applied in Peso, by
adoption from Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, in the
straight-jacket of special knowledge acquired while acting as
directors or senior officers, let alone limiting it to benefits acquired
by reason of and during the holding of these offices." 29 Laskin J.
repudiated the concept that a duty to account could depend on the
question of the confidentiality of the information used, indicating
that, although a breach of confidence might afford a ground for
relief, it was not a necessary ingredient of a successful claim for a
breach of fiduciary duty. 30 There is no doubt that the defendants, if
they had not resigned, would have been engaged in a course of
conduct where their interest was in direct conflict with their duty;
the result of the Supreme Court's judgment was that they were not
to be allowed to escape their duty by walking away from it. Laskin
J. said that "in this developing branch of the law the particular facts
may determine the shape of the principle of decision without setting
fixed limits to it." 3 1 Nevertheless, the judgment does provide some
sign posts indicating the direction the Supreme Court of Canada is
likely to take. The court held that directors and senior officers are
precluded from obtaining for themselves, after full disclosure,
either secretly or without the approval of the company, any business
advantage either belonging to the company or for which it had been
negotiating. Laskin J. said that this was especially so where the
29. Ibid, p. 618.
30. Ibid, p. 616.
31. lbid, p. 618.
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director was a participant in the negotiatons on behalf of the
company. 3 2 He said, "In my opinion this ethic (the fiduciary duty)
disqualifies a director . . from usurping for himself or diverting to
another person or company with whom or with which he is
associated a maturing business opportunity which his company is
actively pursuing." It was his view that neither the conflict test, nor
the test of accountability for profits acquired by reason only of being
directors and in the course of execution of the office, "should be
considered as the exclusive touchstones of liability. In this as in
other branches of the law new fact situations may require
reformulation of existing principles to maintain its vigour in the new
setting." ' 3 3 The judgment placed the emphasis on the duty of a
fiduciary to act loyally and in good faith, always avoiding a conflict
of duty and self-interest. Laskin J. said, "Strict application against
directors and senior management officials is simply recognition of
the degree of control which their positions give them in corporate
operation; a control which rises above day-to-day accountability to
owning shareholders and which comes under some scrutiny only at
Annual General or at Special Meetings. It is a necessary
supplement, in the public interest, of statutory regulation and
accountability which themselves are, at one and the same time, an
acknowledgment of the importance of the corporation in the life of
the community and of the need to compel obedience by it and by its
promoters, directors and managers to norms of exemplary
behaviour."
Thus, the Supreme Court has no intention of placing itself in any
straight-jacket which will prevent it from giving relief where it
considers that the conduct of a director falls short of what it deems
to be appropriate. This is, in some ways, a commendable decision,
leaving the court free to develop the law to conform with the needs
of business conditions. However, it does have the disadvantage that
the shareholder must seek relief by the litigious process which,
although the cost may be avoided, is still time-consuming and, on
occasion, a doubtful process. It is unfortunate that the court, by
distinguishing the Peso case, left directors apparently free to acquire
an opportunity open to a corporation by making a bona fide decision
to reject it on behalf of the corporation.
.

32. Ibid, p. 607.

33. Ibid, p. 609.
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The importance of the decision is that the Supreme Court has
clearly indicated that it will not be bound by any strict boundaries as
to what the obligations of fiduciaries are, but, rather, is intent upon
establishing a general principle which may be used to ensure that
fiduciaries stay not only within the letter of the law, but also within
the spirit. This emphasis on requiring a strict observance of
fiduciary obligations is desirable, as those who assume the burden
of managing the affairs of others should not be able to invoke fine
distinctions when their concern for their own interests outweighs, or
may outweigh, their concern for those to whom they owe a duty.
This approach has important implications for directors appointed
by controlling interests when those interests enter into transactions
with companies they control or when they compete with those of
such companies. The principles enunciated should also be of
concern to directors, when they accede to arrangements with a
parent, that a subsidiary, which is not wholly owned, shall not enter
into competition with its parent. The Can. Aero decision certainly
calls into question earlier cases indicating that a director is free to
compete with his own company. 3 4 Thus, in Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer, 35 when Lord Denning was
referred to authority indicating that a director could join the board of
a rival company, he said, "That may have been so at the time but it
is at the risk now of an application under (the section dealing with
oppression) if he subordinates the interest of one company to those
of the other." The Can. Aero case also calls into question the
principle of Burland v. Earle, 36 which holds that a director may not
be required to account for a corporate opportunity where it is shown
that he did not have any specific commission or mandate to
purchase on behalf of the company. It seems clear that if there is any
concrete evidence showing that a parent company and its nominee
directors acted to appropriate to the parent an opportunity in the
subsidiary's business field, then such nominee directors may be
accountable to the subsidiary.
Even if the Supreme Court of Canada did not intend to weaken
the impact of the Peso case, there can be little doubt that the bona
fides of decisions by directors favouring the controlling interest will
be examined by courts with scrupulous care. Cases where directors
34. London and MashonalandExploration Co. v. New MashonalandCorporation
Co., [1891] W.N. 165.
35. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324.

36. Burland v. Earle, [1902] A.C. 83.
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obtain for themselves an advantage which should have been given to
the company by any standards of business propriety are,
fortunately, the exception, rather than the rule. A more serious
concern for minority shareholders is whether directors are applying
their business judgement solely with a view to the interests of the
corporation when such corporations are doing business with the
dominant shareholder. The approach taken by the court in the Can.
Aero case indicates that the deference courts have traditionally
shown to the business judgment of directors will, in all probability,
not be extended where it is apparent that those directors were
nominees of controlling shareholders having interests which
conflicted or could conflict with those of the corporation. The bona
fides of such directors in entering into such transactions will be
closely examined to ensure that the transaction was in the interests
of the corporation. Accordingly, the trend of the law should cause
directors to consider their duties very carefully in such situations,
and to ensure that the decisions are taken honestly and in good faith,
with a view to the best interests of the corporations.
Under the federal legislation, a director who either himself is a
party to a material contract or is a director, officer, or has a material
interest in any person who is such a party is required to disclose the
nature and intent of this interest in writing. He is prohibited from
voting on such a contract unless it is one described in section
115(5). He may vote where the contract is one with an affiliate.
When such an interest is disclosed, such a material contract is not
void or voidable by reason only of that relationship or that such a
director was present or counted to determine the presence of a
quorum at a meeting of directors if "the contract was approved by
the directors or the shareholders and it was reasonable and fair to the
37
corporation at the time it was approved."
The wisdom of permitting directors of corporations which are not
wholly owned subsidiaries to vote when such a corporation is
entering into a contract with an affiliate is debatable, as the conflict
of interest is just as real in such cases as in other conflict situations.
Yet the director who votes in such circumstances will still be subject
to the statutory obligation to act in good faith and with a view to the
best interests of the corporation. Furthermore, to obtain the benefit
of the protection conferred by the act, the contract must be one
which "was reasonable and fair to the corporation at the time it was
37. Section 115(7).
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approved." 3 Such a contract may be ratified by the shareholders,
but unless the directors have carried out their statutory obligations,
such ratification will avail them little, as section 117(3) of the
Canada Business Corporations Act provides, inter alia, that no
resolution "relieves a director or officer from the duty to act in
accordance with this Act ...or relieves him from liability for a
breach thereof." Accordingly, when contracts are made by
corporations with affiliates, directors or corporations bear a heavy
fiduciary responsibility for which they may only be indemnified if
they acted in good faith.
Thus, the statutory and common law applicable to directors does
establish a set of principles which will permit courts to impose on
directors fiduciary responsibilities which should ensure fair
treatment for the minority. The major problem for minorities lies
not with the law, but with the reliance on the litigious remedy,
which, even though it may be pursued without cost where the court
approves, is a time-consuming process, fraught with difficulties
which frequently cause shareholders to sell their shares rather than
engage in an uncertain process requiring initiative and determination. Faced with these difficulties, even shareholders with a
significant financial interest are likely to shy away from the
litigation remedy and either sell their shares or compromise their
differences with a controlling interest. The direction of the courts is
towards imposing a high standard of fiduciary obligation on
directors, but as the developments in the last quarter century
indicate, the progress is slow, depending as it does on a
case-by-case approach.

III. Power of Majority to Bind Minority
Although the common law, supplemented by statutory law, has
done much to ensure that directors of public corporations selected
by controlling interests will act in the interests of the corporation,
the position taken with respect to the right of the majority to vote in
its own interests is much less satisfactory. Legislation has, in some
jurisdictions, altered the common law by requiring that contracts in
which directors have interests may only be ratified if they are fair to
the corporation. Nevertheless, there are still a large number of
occasions when the interests of minorities may be adversely affected
by majority action. Thus, it is important to determine when
38. Burland v. Earle, supra, p. 83.
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majorities may vote, the interests they may take into account in
voting, and the weight to be given to such votes.
Majority rule has been one of the cornerstones of the law of
corporations, as courts have ordinarily adhered to the principle that
the shareholders are the best judges of their own interests.
Nevertheless, although the law has always recognized that minority
shareholders have certain rights worthy of protection, courts have
tended to limit the occasions when they would interfere and have
afforded to the majority a wide power to ratify the acts of directors
which might be questioned. One feature of this approach was the
infamous rule in Foss and Harbottle which, for so long, operated to
limit effective actions by minorities. The corporate approach to the
rights of majorities owed much to the concern that the courts of the
nineteenth century had for freedom of contract; consequently, the
courts only interfered with the right of majorities to run corporations
as they saw fit where the results in their view-amounted to "fraud"
or where the majority was attempting to confirm ultra vires or illegal
acts. Thus, in Re Jury Goldmines Ltd., 39 Middleton J.A. said,
"The company itself is the proper forum for the settlement of
domestic differences."
The result of this philosophy was that courts were very reluctant
to interfere with the power of the majority, so that a minority to
obtain relief had to show clear abuse by the majority, such as an
appropriation by the majority of the assets of the company to
themselves. The majority were afforded a substantial power to ratify
contracts in which the majority had an interest by the decision of the
Privy Council in Northwest TransportationCo. v. Beatty, 4" where
Beatty, a majority shareholder, sold a ship to the company and
voted his own shares at a general meeting to ratify the contract. The
Privy Council held that he had a right to vote in such circumstances
as his conduct did not amount to fraud or oppression of the
minority. The contract was shown to be a desirable one and, in fact,
would have been ratified in any event by the votes of the
shareholders if Beatty had not voted. Thus, in the particular case,
the judgement of independent shareholders vindicated that transaction, but this was not the focal point of the decision.
The Privy Council overruled the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Canada, which took a much broader view of the obligations of
39. Re Jury GoldminesLtd. (1928) 40 O.L.R. 735 at p. 736.
40. Northwest TransportationCo. v. Beatty (1887) 12 A.C. 589.
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directors and interested shareholders who had an interest in the
transaction being ratified. Chief Justice Ritchie said that "fair play
and common sense alike dictate that if the transaction and act of the
director are to be confirmed, it should be by the impartial,
independent, and intelligent judgment of the disinterested shareholders, and not by the interested director himself who should never
have departed from his duty." 4 Sir Richard Baggallay, giving the
opinion of the Privy Council, noted that no unfairness or
impropriety had been established, and said, "It may be quite right,
in such a case the opposing minority should be able, in a suit like
this, to challenge the transaction, and to show that it is an improper
one and to be freed from the objection that a suit with such an object
can only be maintained by the company itself. . he [Beatty] had a
perfect right to acquire further shares and to exercise his voting
power in such a manner as to secure the election of directors whose
views upon policy agreed with his own and to support those views at
any shareholders' meeting; the acquisition of the United Empire was
a pure question of policy, as to which it might be expected there
would be differences of opinion and upon which the voice of the
majority ought to prevail; to reject the votes of the defendant upon
the question of the adoption of the by-law would be to give effect to
the views of the minority, and to disregard those of the majority."
The Privy Council took no account whatsoever of the interest of
Beatty's which differed from that of the other shareholders, beyond
indicating that ratification could occur because the transaction was a
fair one. Thus, the view of the Supreme Court of Canada was swept
into the discard by the opinion, with the result that the powers of
majorities to ratify the action of directors have since then been
considered to be rather extensive, subject only to restraint where the
acts complained of were, in the opinion of the court, of a fraudulent
character.
Thus, in Dominion Cotton Mill v. Amyot, 42 a parent was
permitted to use its votes to ratify a lease to itself from a subsidiary.
The approving shareholders' resolution was set aside by the trial
judge, who held that the lease had been approved by the controlling
shareholders for their own benefit and that it was unfair to the
subsidiary. The Privy Council disagreed with this finding, holding
that there had been no unfair dealing. Lord MacNaughten, in giving
41. (1887) 12S.C.R. 598.
42. Dominion Cotton Mill v. Amyot, 4 D.L.R. 306.
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the opinion, said, "The cases in which the minority can maintain
such an action are therefore confined to those in which the acts
complained of are of a fraudulent character or beyond the powers of
the company." 43 The attitude of the courts in other cases is
evidenced by the judgment of Middleton J.A., in Re: Jury
Goldmine Development Co., 44 where he said, "He is a minority
shareholder and must endure the unpleasantness incident to that
situation. If he chooses to risk his money by subscribing for shares,
it is part of his bargain that he will submit to the will of the majority.
In the absence of fraud or transactions ultra vires, the majority must
govern and there should be no appeal to the courts for redress."
Courts did give relief where they concluded that the majority was
attempting to expropriate the company's money, property, or
advantages for its own benefit. 45 The underlying justification for
relief in these cases was that the majority, by appropriating to
themselves the property of the company, was committing a fraud on
the minority. Little attention was paid to whether the majority had
any greater duty to the minority or to the corporation in exercising
its powers, or whether the case for shareholders' interests being
determined by the majority lost some of its force when its business
interests differed from those of the corporation. However, the
Ontario Court of Appeal, in Grey v. Yellowknife Goldmines
Limited, 46 held that a majority could place itself in a fiduciary
position to a subsidiary. In that case, the parent had caused the
subsidiary to sell its holdings of Giant Yellowknife Mines to the
parent, and the minority shareholders of the subsidiary were
deprived of a chance to share in a potentially profitable development
program. Both companies had common directors who held large
share interests of the parent company, but only nominal personal
holdings of the subsidiary, so that there was a clear conflict of
interest with duty. The court held that, by assuming the
management of the subsidiary pursuant to a management
agreement, the parent had placed itself in a fiduciary position to the
subsidiary and the conduct of the directors of the subsidiary in
furthering the interests of the parent constituted a fraud on the
minority. The case could have been decided on the sole ground that
43. Ibid, p. 310.
44. Re Jury Goldmine Development Co., supra, at p. 736.
45. (1874) 9 Ch. App. 350: Cook v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A,C. 554;Nolan v. Parsons
(1942) O.R. 358.
46. Grey v. Yellowknife Goldmines Limited (1946) O.R., p. 639.

62 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the majority's actions were designed to appropriate the property of
the subsidiary to the parent. Nevertheless, the decision is a
significant one, as it may indicate the attitude courts will take where
it is perfectly apparent that the management and directorate of the
subsidiary have been selected by the majority.
The decision of the House of Lords in Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society Limited v. Meyer 4 7 is a step in the same
direction, as, although it was decided under section 210 of the
United Kingdom companies legislation, which gives a remedy for
oppression, there seems no real reason why the same approach
could not be taken in the development of the common law and the
oppression remedy of the Canada Business Corporations Act. In
that case, a parent had attempted to obtain all of the shares of a
subsidiary, and upon its offer being rejected, it established a
competing business. It refused to supply further raw materials to the
subsidiary, which was dependent on it for such materials, with the
result that the value of the subsidiary's shares was considerably
reduced. The majority of the directors of the subsidiary were
nominees of the parent and were well aware that its policy was to
destroy the business of the subsidiary. The nominee directors took
no action to destroy the business of the company, but neither did
they take any action to save it. It was argued that the conduct of the
parent was not oppression in carrying out the affairs of the
subsidiary, as the activities complained of related to the conduct of
its own affairs, which could not constitute any ground for relief for
the section. Viscount Simonds said, with reference to the nominee
directors:
But in all the evidence I have not been able to find the least trace
that they regarded themselves as owing any duty to the company
of which they were directors. They were the nominees of the
Society (the parent) and if the Society doomed the company to
destruction it was not for them to put out a saving hand. Rather,
they were to join in that work and when a frank and prompt
statement to their co-directors might have enabled them to
retrieve its fortunes they played their part by maintaining silence.
That is how they conducted the affairs of the company and it is
impossible to suppose that that was not part of the deliberate
policy of the Society. As I have said, nominees of a parent
company upon the board of a subsidiary company may be placed
in a difficult and delicate position. It is then the more incumbent
47. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited v. Meyer (1959) A.C. 324 at
p. 341; Selangor UnitedRubber Estates v. Craddock, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555.
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on the parent company to behave with scrupulous fairness to the
minority shareholders and to avoid imposing upon their nominees
the alternative of disregarding their instructions or betraying the
interests of the minority.
In answer to the argument that the society's conduct may have
been oppressive but that it did not constitute conduct in relation to
the affairs of the society, Viscount Simonds said:
It is not possible to separate the transactions of the Society from
those of the company. Every step taken by the latter was
determined by the policy of the former. It is just because the
Society could not only use the ordinary and legitimate weapons
of commercial warfare, but could also control from within the
operations of the company that it is illegitimate to regard the
conduct of the company's affairs as a matter for which it had no
responsibility.
He also stated that:
Whenever a subsidiary is formed as in this case with an
independent minority of shareholders, the parent company must,
if it is engaged in the same class of business, accept as a result of
having formed such a subsidiary an obligation so to conduct what
are in a sense its own affairs as to deal fairly with its subsidiary.
Lord Keith said:
But I cannot think that where directors having power to do
something to save a company lie back and do nothing they are not
conducting the affairs of the company perhaps foolishly, perhaps
negligently, perhaps with some ulterior object in view. They are
certainly conducting the affairs of the company in breach of their
duties as directors. In the present case I would go further for I
think that the production of rayon cloth at the mill was an affair of
the company and that the Society being a majority shareholder in
the company cannot claim that in divesting this production to
itself and obstructing supplies to the company it was acting for
itself and not conducting the affairs of the company in a manner
unfair and oppressive to the minority shareholders.
Lord Denning said:
It must be remembered that we are here concerned with the
manner in which the affairs of the textile company were being
conducted. That is, with the conduct of those in control of its
affairs. They may be some of the directors themselves, or behind
them a group of shareholders who nominate those directors or
whose interest those directors serve. If those persons, the
nominee directors or the shareholders behind them conduct the
affairs of the company in a manner oppressive to the other
shareholders the Court can intervene to bring an end to the
oppression.
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The House of Lords found that the inaction of the directors was
oppressive conduct.
Clearly, this decision applies in those jurisdictions where a
statutory oppression remedy is available. The rationale underlying
the decision may, as indicated in the Grey & Yellowknife case, have
a much wider application and cause the courts to restrain voting by
majority shareholders or disregard such votes completely in
assessing whether a shareholder's resolution should stand.
Although the courts are not prepared to allow a majority to, in
effect, expropriate the property of the company, they have
accorded, even in modern times, a rather broad power to ratify the
action of directors in acquiring corporate opportunities for
themselves or acting in circumstances where they have a conflict of
interest. Thus, in Zwicker v. Stanbury,4 8 Kellock J. indicated that a
transaction in which directors were in breach of their fiduciary
duties could be ratified. 4 9 Unfortunately, the judgment did not
indicate whether the directors could have voted their own shares for
ratification of the transaction. Similarly, Lord Russell concluded, in
the Regal case, that a majority of the shareholders could have
ratified the directors' breach of their duty. 50 It is regrettable that the
courts, in considering this question of ratification, have not dealt
conclusively with the right of the interested shareholder to vote and
that the statutory reforms have also failed to address the question
conclusively. There seems to be much merit in the suggestion of
Idington J., in Theatre Amusement Co. v. Stone,51 that the sooner
the corporate legislation is amended to prevent "any shareholder by
his own vote to help himself to sell his property to the company of
which he is a shareholder, the better it will be for the moral health of
the business community." The same comment is apt in any
situation where a shareholder has an extraneous interest which is
clearly in conflict with the mutual interests of shareholders. If one
concedes that shareholders should be entitled to govern corporations
because they are the best judges of their own interests, it seems
apparent that it is those shareholders who have a common interest
with the corporation who should decide and not those whose
48. Supra, note 20 at 438.
49. Ibid, p. 4 51.
50. Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 at p. 389. See also
Peso (1966) 56 D.L.R. 117 at p. 139 and Canadian Safeway Ltd. v. Thompson
(1951) 3 D.L.R. 295.
51. Theatre Amusement Co. v. Stone (1915), 50 S.C.R. 35.
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interests may be adverse to it. The appropriate approach is surely
that no man is likely to be a good judge of his own cause and the
deference afforded to majority decisions should cease when it is
apparent that the majority has an interest which is or may be adverse
to that of the corporation.
There is a strange dichotomy in the decisions of the courts as to
the ratification of transactions at meetings of common shareholders
and the approach which has been taken to the right of a majority of
debenture holders, or the majority of the shareholders of a class, to
exercise their votes as they see fit. The courts have held, in a series
of cases, that such a shareholder or debenture holder must vote in
the interests of the class of which he is a member. Thus, in Re
Wedgwood Coal & Iron Company, 52 Malins V.C. said that:
I think it is perfectly clear that all resolutions of this kind,
whether they are resolutions by a majority of debtors to buy the
minority, as in bankruptcy, or whether they are by a majority to
bind the minority under any Act of Parliament, must be passed
bona fide and without sinister objects.
In that case, he held that it was quite improper for a debenture
holder to vote when he had interests adverse to the class of
debenture holders. The Court of Appeal in Re Alabama, New
Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company5 3 approved
a scheme of arrangement which had been sanctioned by a majority
of first debenture holders who were also holders of junior securities.
Lindley L.J. held that where there were adverse interests, "[t]hat
state of complicated interest would not prevent them from voting,
but it would necessarily induce the court to look with caution and
care at the effect of what was done at that meeting." 4 Bowan L.J.
took much the same position, holding that the debenture holders in
question could vote, but indicating that he would not regard that as
determinative of the interests of the class if it turned out that the
majority was composed of persons who really did not have the
interests of that class at stake. The Court of Appeal in effect
examined the merits of the proposal and satisfied itself that it was
one that a member could reasonably have approved of as acting in
55
the interest of the class.
52. Re Wedgwood Coal & Iron Company (1877) 6 Ch. D. 627 at p. 635.
53. Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company,
[1891] 1 Ch. 213.
54. Ibid, at p. 2 3 9 et seq.
55. See also Re English, Scottish and Australian CharteredBank, [1893] 3 Ch.

385.
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Accordingly, in cases involving class votes, the courts, at a rather
early date, arrived at a position where they would not regard a vote
as binding where there were adverse interests. They would consider
whether the arrangement was a fair and reasonable one which could
be adopted as being in the interest of the class as a whole; the
inquiry was not directed solely to whether the act of the majority
constituted fraud or oppression.
The leading case on the subject is British American Nickel v.
O'Brien, which related to a class vote on a reconstruction scheme
by members of a class of debentures. 56 In that case, one of the
debenture holders was induced by the promise of a large block of
stock to vote in favour of the scheme. The Privy Council held that
the approving resolution was invalid because the promise made to
the debenture holder caused him to vote in his own interest, rather
than in the interest of the class. Viscount Haldane considered the
power to vary the rights of the debenture holders to be analogous to
the power of a majority of a special class of shareholders to change
the articles of association. "There is, however, a restriction of such
powers when conferred on a majority of a special class in order to
enable that majority to bind a minority. They must be exercised
subject to a general principle, which is applicable to all authorities
conferred on a majorities of classes enabling them to bind
minorities; namely, that the power must be exercised to the purpose
of benefiting the class as a whole and not merely individual
' ' 57
members only. Subject to this the power may be unrestricted.
He then reviewed the decisions in Burland v. Earle and Northwest
Transportationv. Beatty, stating that it had been suggested that the
decisions in these cases were difficult to reconcile with the
restriction applicable in the case of class votes. However, he also
said, "[b]ut their Lordships do not think there is any real difficulty
in combining the principle that while a holder of shares or
debentures may vote as his interest directs, he is subject to the
further principle that where his vote is conferred on him as a
member of a class, he must conform to the interest of the class itself
when seeking to exercise the power conferred on him in his capacity
as being a member." 5 8s He concluded that the distinction "may
prove a fine one", a sentiment which is easily echoed.
56. [1927] A.C. 369.
57. Ibid, p. 371.
58. Ibid, p. 373.
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The principle enunciated in that case has also been applied to
votes by class of shareholders in Carruth v. Imperial Chemical
Industries Limited,5 9 which involved a scheme to alter the rights of
several classes of shares and reduce the capital. It was shown that a
number of ordinary shareholders had voted at the meeting of
deferred shareholders and that the interests of these groups differed.
Lord Russell of Killoren held, in effect, that, in view of the large
number of votes given at the meeting of deferred shareholders by
holders of ordinary shares, the court should itself decide the
question of fairness or unfairness on the evidence before it. 60 Lord
Maugham said 6 ' that both Eve J. and the Court of Appeal seemed to
have laid considerable stress on the well-known proposition that
shareholders acting honestly are usually much better judges of what
is to their commercial advantage than a court can be:
I do not intend to throw the smallest doubt on this general
proposition which I have had occasion, more than once, to
repeat, but I doubt very much whether it is of great value as a
guide when it is proved that the majority of the class have voted
or may have voted as they did because of their interest as
shareholders of another class. If the court is satisfied that the
deferred shareholders in this case considered the matter from a
proper point of view; that is, with a view to the interest of the
class to which they belong and are empowered to bind, the court
ought to be slow to differ from them.
This decision was followed in Hanson v. Canada Trust, 62 a case
involving a composition between a mortgagor and the holders of its
mortgage bonds. The court found that the majority had been
influenced by motives of charity and benevolence to the mortgagor
in approving a composition which deprived the bond holders of
substantial amounts of interest. There was no imputation of bad
faith or collateral advantage raised against the majority shareholder,
but the court held that the majority could not impose its will on the
63
minority as it was not acting in the interests of the class.
The distinction, made in British American Nickel Corporation v.
O'Brien, between the position of a shareholder when he votes as a
member of a class and his position when he votes purely in his
capacity as a shareholder is difficult to understand. If the courts are
59. Carruthv. ImperialChemical IndustriesLimited, [1937] A.C. 707.

60. lbid, p. 763.
61. lbid, p. 7 69 .
62. Hanson v. Canada Trust (1951) S.C.R., p. 366.
63. Ibid, pp. 379-380.
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prepared to question the decision of a majority in a class vote where
the decision has been motivated by outside interests differing from
those of the class, it seems right that they should be prepared to do
so whenever a majority is- imposing its will on the minority. The
rationale for the view that the majority and not the courts are in the
best position to judge what is in the interest of the company
disappears when the majority decision is or may be based on the
self-interest of that majority.
It is quite clear that courts are unlikely to be content with the
decisions made by majorities where they do not share the same
interests as all shareholders. An interesting example of this is the
decision in Re Hellenic & General Trust. 64 In that case, a vote was
held on a scheme of arrangement proposed as an alternative to a
takeover bid which would not have succeeded because the
dissenting minority held a sufficient block of shares to prevent the
exercise of the compulsory acquisition powers. Under the
arrangement, the parent company of the majority shareholder would
have become the sole owner, as the minority would have been
required to dispose of its shares for cash. Templeman J. refused to
sanction the arrangement because the majority had an interest
differing from that of the other ordinary shareholders, and
concluded that there were really two classes of ordinary
shareholders and that separate class meetings should have been
held. He said that it had been suggested to him that all shareholders
had the same interest and that they were all capable of forming an
independent and unbiased judgement, irrespective of the interest of
the parent company:
This seems to me to be unreal. Hambros are purchasers making
an offer. When the vendors meet to discuss and vote whether or
not to accept the offer, it is incongruous that the loudest voice in
64. Re Hellenic & General Trust, [1975] 3 All E.R. 382. It is interesting to
compare the approach taken in Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Company, I Cal. 3d

93, where the California Court of Appeal considered a case where the majority had
used their powers to destroy the marketability of the minority's shares. The court
held that the majority had acted improperly in using their control to secure for
themselves an advantage not made available to all shareholders, by establishing a
public holding company for their own shares which effectively destroyed the
market for the shares of the corporation, thus diminishing the value of the minority
holding. The court said that, in California, the power of a majority "may not be
exercised for the aggrandizement, preference or advantage of the fiduciary to the
exclusion or detriment of the cestuis." In their view, the majority owed a duty of
inherent fairness "from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein."
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theory and most significant vote in practice should come from the
wholly owned subsidiary of the purchaser. No one can be both a
vendor and a purchaser and in my judgment, for the purpose of
the class meetings
in the present case, MIT were in the camp of
65
the purchaser.
In determining that ordinary shareholders could be divided into
different classes on the basis of their economic interests,
Templeman J. was following some earlier precedents. In Sovereign
Life InsuranceCompany v. Dodd, 66 the English Court of Appeal, in
a case relating to the winding-up of an insurance company, held that
it was appropriate under the governing statute to require separate
meetings of policy holders who had differing economic interests.
Speaking of the statute authorizing the meetings, which was a rather
general one, Bowen L.J. said:
What is the proper construction of that statute. It makes the
majority of the creditors or of a class of creditors bind the
minority; it exercises the most formidable compulsion upon
dissentient or would-be dissentient creditors and it therefore
requires to be construed with care so as not to place in the hands
of some of the creditors the means and opportunity of forcing
dissentients to do that which it is unreasonable to require them to
do or of making a mere jest of the interests of the minority.
He construed the word "class" in the statute as requiring a separate
vote by these two groups of policy holders with divergent interests,
67
in the sense that one held matured policies and the other did not.
Similarly, in Re United ProvidentAssurance Company Limited, 68 it
was held that holders of partly paid shares constituted a different
class from holders of fully paid shares. Whatever one may think of
the device of segregating shareholders or policy holders into
differing classes on the basis of their differing economic interests,
there is little doubt that the result achieved is a salutory one, unless
one believes that the majority have the right to prefer their own
interests to that of the general interest of shareholders when
exercising their voting power. A simpler approach is that adopted in
British American v. O'Brien, as an equitable result can be achieved
by simply regarding the votes cast by those with conflicting interests
69
as being without weight or persuasive value.
65. Ibid, p. 386.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Sovereign Life Insurance Company v. Dodd, [1892] 2 Q.1B. 573.
Ibid, pp. 581-3.
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Courts have interfered in a somewhat different class of cases at
the suit of minority shareholders where the majority were exercising
their powers to amend the corporation's charter. In such cases, the
courts have intervened when they believed that a power to alter the
articles was being exercised not "bona fide for the benefit of the
company as a whole' '70 or where they believed that the result of the
action was "to give the (majority) an advantage of which the
(minority) was deprived."' ' v Thus, in Brown v. British Abrasive
Wheel Co. Limited,72 the court acted to restrain a change in the
articles which would have provided for the compulsory acquisition
of minority shareholdings at a fair value. The defendant company
needed further capital, which the holders of 98 percent of the shares
were willing to provide if they could acquire the remaining 2
percent. Astbury J. ruled that such an article was not for the benefit
of the company as a whole, but was only for the benefit of the
majority and was oppressive to the minority even though there was
no question about the good faith of the majority. In this case, it is
obvious that the interests being protected were those of the body of
the shareholders which were considered to be the same as those of
the company.
A somewhat similar compulsory acquisition was restrained in
Dafen Tinplate Co. v. Llanelly Steel Co., 73 where an article
provided for the compulsory acquisition of the shares of any
shareholder. This article was being adopted because the plaintiff
had ceased to buy its steel from the defendant and had opened its
own steel plant. Peterson J. ruled that the article was wider than was
required to protect the interest of the company, as it enabled the
majority to acquire the shares of any shareholder and was,
accordingly, not for the benefit of the company as a whole. It
appears from this judgment that the article would have been upheld
if it was directed at the particular shareholder who was competing
with the company, as Peterson J. said the power not being restricted
to cases where the shareholders' conduct was detrimental to the
company, it could not be for the company's benefit. In Sidebottom
vote has been raised, but not determined, in two Ontario cases: Carlton Realty
Company Ltd. v. Maple Leaf Mills Ltd. (1978) 22 O.R. 198 and Alexander v.
Westeel-Rosco Ltd. (1978) 220.R. 211.
70. Allen v. Goldreefsof West Africa, [ 1901] Ch. 656 at p. 671.
71. Greenhalgh v. Arderne CinemasLtd., [ 1951 ] Ch. 286 at p. 291.
72. Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co. Limited, [1919] 1 Ch. 290.
73. Dafen Tinplate Co. v. Llanelly Steel Co., [ 1920] 2 Ch. 124.
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v. Kershaw Leese & Co. Ltd., 14 an article providing for compulsory
acquisition of the shares of a competitor was upheld by the Court of
Appeal on the ground that it was enacted bona fide for the benefit of
the company to protect it from competitors. The Brown case was
distinctive because in it the article was enacted only for the benefit
of the majority. In Shuttleworth v. Cox, 75 a majority was allowed to
enact an article removing a permanent director who had been
accused of financial irregularity. In that case, Bankes L.J. said that
the court should not interfere with the action of the majority unless
the alteration "is such that no reasonable man could consider it for
the benefit of the company."76
There has been a considerable difference of opinion as to the
meaning of the requirement that the majority, when enacting
resolutions, must act "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a
whole". In Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd., Evershed M.R.,
in discussing this problem, said that:
Certain things, I think, can be safely stated as emerging from
these authorities. In the first place, it is now plain that "bona fide
for the benefit of the company as a whole" means not two things
but one thing. It means that the shareholder must proceed on
what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a
whole. Secondly, the phrase "the company as a whole" does not
• . . mean the company as a commercial entity as distinct from
the incorporators. It means the corporators as a general body.
That is to say, you may take the case of an individual
hypothetical member and ask whether what is proposed is, in the
honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, for that person's
benefit. I think the thing can, in practice, be more accurately and
precisely stated by looking at the converse and by saying that a
special resolution of this kind would be liable to be impeached if
the effect of it were to discriminate between the majority
shareholders and the minority shareholders so as to give the
former an advantage of which the latter were deprived.
When the cases where the resolution has been successfully
attacked are examined, it is on the ground of discrimination that
such attacks have been successful. However, this ground of
interference is a relatively narrow one, for, if the amendment
applies equally to all shareholders, it appears that the court may not
hold it to be discriminatory even though it only affects the minority
adversely. In Greenhalgh, an amendment to the restrictions on
74. Sidebottom v. Kershaw Leese & Co. Ltd., [ 1920] 1 Ch. 154 at 162.
75. Shuttleworth v. Cox, [1927] 2 K.B. 9.
76. Ibid, p. 18.
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transfer of the company's shares was made to permit a shareholder
to sell to an outsider with the approval of a majority, thus negating
an article prohibiting a transfer to an outsider when a shareholder
was prepared to purchase at fair value. It was held that this did not
discriminate against the minority because it applied equally to all
shareholders seeking to acquire control and prevented all
shareholders from selling their shares to an outsider if the majority
was opposed to it. Yet Evershed M.R. said that the appropriate test
was to determine whether the effect of the resolution was "to
discriminate between the majority shareholders and the minority
shareholders so as to give to the former an advantage of which the
latter was deprived." In the result, only the majority could
effectively sell to outsiders, as majority consent was required. The
result, effectively limiting the right of the minority to acquire the
shares and permitting the majority to effectively sanction a
take-over, may be explained because the majority was acting bona
fide, as the purchaser was bidding for all the shares of the company
at what the court considered to be a fair price. 7 7 Thus, the minority
did not suffer any real disadvantage and the majority did not acquire
any benefit denied to the minority. The result may have been
different if a sale by the minority had been blocked.
Courts have permitted majorities to ratify an issue of shares, by
directors, designed to preserve the voting control of a company. In
Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., 78 the board of directors, faced with a
takeover which they believed not to be in the interest of the
company, issued to an employees' pension trust sufficient
preference shares to permit the directors and their associates to
control the company. Buckley J. decided that their action could be
ratified at a general meeting of shareholders, saying that:
Unless a majority in a company is acting oppressively towards
the minority, this court should not and will not itself interfere
with the exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights or
embark on an inquiry into the respective merits of the views held
or policies favoured by the majority and the minority . . . A

majority of shareholders in general meeting is entitled to pursue
what course it chooses within the company's power, however
wrong-headed it may appear to others, provided the79majority do
not unfairly oppress other members of the company.
Accordingly, he adjourned the hearing to permit a shareholders'
77. Greenhalghv. Arderne Cinemas Ltd., [1946] 1 All E.R. 512.
78. Hogg v. CramphornLtd., [1966] 3 All E.R. 420.

79. Ibid, p. 428.
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meeting to be held at which the disputed shares could not be voted,
although the directors were not restrained from voting their own
shares. Thus, they could effectively vote to secure a continuing
control of the corporation by ratifying the issue of shares. The right
of a majority to ratify an issue of shares was also considered in
Bamford and Another v. Bamford and Others,8 0 where the court
reviewed what it regarded as an intra vires issue of shares by the
directors of the company which was voidable because the directors
were actuated by improper motives. Shares had been issued for the
purpose of blocking a take-over; subsequent to the issue of the writ,
a meeting of shareholders approved the allotment. Relying on the
decision in Northwest Transportation Co. Limited v. Beatty,
Harman L. J. held that the issue was voidable, but could be ratified
by the majority because it was neither illegal or fraudulent or
oppressive towards the shareholders who opposed it. 81 In this case,
shareholders voting to ratify the issue were, in effect, determining
whether they wished to accept or reject the take-over bid, and their
interest and their vote was being cast having regard to their interest
as shareholders and nothing else. In such circumstances, there can
be no objection to the majority will prevailing. The ratification at a
general meeting secured by the votes of directors of an issue of
shares to preserve their own control raises different considerations.
Unfortunately, Buckley J. in Hogg v. Cramphorn did not consider
the propriety of the directors voting in such circumstances where
their interests were different from those of other shareholders.
Having regard to the substantial powers exercised by majorities to
control the destinies of corporations by effectively selecting their
directors, and the important role they exercise in determining
whether fundamental changes shall be made in the charter of
corporations, it is unfortunate that the courts have not formulated
clearer rules as to when an extraneous interest of a majority will lead
a court to restrain its actions. The position taken by American courts
provides an interesting contrast. In 1920, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Geddes, et al v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Company, et al, 82 held that:
The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary
nature that transactions between boards having common
members are regarded as zealously by the law as are personal
80. Bamford and Another v. Bamford and Others, [ 1969] 1 All E.R. 969.
81. Ibid, p. 972 etseq.
82. Geddes, et al v. Anaconda Copper Mining Company, et al, 254 U.S. 590.
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dealings between a director and his corporation, and where the
fairness of such transactions is challenged the burden is upon
those who would maintain them to show their entire fairness and
where a sale is involved the full adequacy of the consideration.
Especially is this true where a common director is dominating in
influence or in character. This court has been consistently
emphatic in the application of this rule, which it has declared, is
founded in soundest morality, and we now add in the soundest
business policy.
In Perlman v. Feldmann, 83 the United States Court of Appeal,
Second Circuit, held that a dominant stockholder and principal
officer was accountable to minority stockholders when he sold his
own stock to steel users who were seeking control of the corporation
in order to control the distribution of steel at a time of steel shortage.
Chief Judge Clark, who gave the majority judgment, held that:
Both as director and as dominant stockholder, Feldmann stood in
a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and to the minority
shareholders as beneficiaries thereof . . . Directors of a business
corporation act in a strictly fiduciary capacity. Their office is a
trust . . . directors of a corporation are its agents and they are
governed by the rules of law applicable to other agents and, as
between themselves and their principal, the rules relating to
honesty and fair dealing in the management of the affairs of their
principal are applicable. They must not in any degree allow their
official conduct to be swayed by their private interest which must
yield to official duty. In the transaction between a director and a
corporation where he acts for himself and his principal at the
same time in a matter connected with the relation between them it
is presumed, where he is thus potentially on both sides of the
contract, that self interest will overcome his fidelity to his
principal, to his own benefit and to his principal's hurt . ..
absolute and most scrupulous good faith is the very essence of a
director's obligations to his corporation. The first principal duty
arising from his official relation is to act
in all things of trust
84
wholly for the benefit of the corporation.
Chief Justice Clark said that although the principles were
particularly relevant to Feldmann as a director, the same rule should
apply to his fiduciary duties as majority stockholder, "for in that
capacity, he chooses and controls the directors and thus is held to
assume their liability." 85 He then commented on the issue of bona
fides:
83. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F (2d) 173.
84. Ibid, p. 176.
85. Ibid, p. 176.
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It is true . . . that this is not the ordinary case of breach of
fiduciary duty. We hear of no fraud, no misuse of confidential
information, no outright looting of a helpless corporation but on
the other hand, we do not find compliance with that high standard
which we have just stated and which we and other courts have
come to expect and demand of a corporate fiduciary. In the often
quoted words of Judge Cardozo, "Many forms of conduct
permissible in a work-a-day world for those acting at arm's
length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honour, the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behaviour."
In Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corporation,86 the Delaware Court of
Chancery held that a parent had not dealt fairly with its subsidiary as
it had not made any serious effort to develop the subsidiary
corporation, but had acted to restrict its activities. The parent
company held ninety-seven percent of the outstanding stock of the
subsidiary and, at all relevant times, had selected its directors and
management. The court held that, given the domination which the
selection of directors and officers secured, the parent's duty to its
subsidiary was that of a fiduciary. Chancellor Duffy quoted with
approval the decision of Guth v. Loft Inc., 87 saying that:
When the persons be they stockholders or directors, who control
the making of a transaction and the fixing of its terms are on both
sides then the presumption and deference to sound business
judgment are no longer present. Intrinsic fairness tested by all
relevant standards is then the criterion.
However, a shareholder may vote in his own interest so long as he
meets whatever duty may be imposed upon him toward the
minority. That is established by Tanzer v. International General
Industries Inc., 88 where the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a
majority shareholder was entitled to vote his shares for approval of a
merger made primarily to advance his own business purpose. The
court held that, subject to this duty to other shareholders, the
stockholder was free to represent his own interest, including the
expectation of personal profit, limited, of course, by any duty he
owed to other shareholders. In Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 8 9 the
Delaware Court of Chancery held that in the case of a merger
86. Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corporation, 261 A (2d) 911; Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 at p. 306.
87. Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A (2d) 503.
88. Tanzer v. InternationalGeneral Industries Inc., 379 Atlantic Reporter 112 1.
89. Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 426 Atlantic Reporter, 2d series, p. 1333.
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transaction, a majority shareholder owed a fiduciary duty of entire
fairness to minority shareholders where the equity position of the
minority in a merged corporation was being affected. It was of the
view that those who controlled the corporate machinery owed a
fiduciary duty to the minority in the exercise of such powers and the
use of such powers to perpetuate control may be a violation of that
duty. It also found that the use of corporate power to eliminate the
minority was a violation of that duty. It concluded that, even if the
purpose of the merger was bona fide, there must still be a hearing to
determine whether the terms were fair to the minority stockholders.
The underlying rationale for the decision appears to be that
whenever the majority is exercising its power to obtain some
advantage which will not be shared in by all shareholders, then the
court will determine whether the transaction is fair to minority
shareholders. In cases involving ratification of an interested director
transaction, the approval by a majority of the disinterested
shareholders has not generally been required as a condition of
shareholder ratification. However, there is a trend in this direction,
as courts recently have been declining to accept ratification by an
"interested majority as immunizing an unfair transaction. "90
This is a very cursory view of the United States' position, and
fails utterly to describe all the fiduciary obligations which American
courts have imposed on dominant or majority shareholders. 9 1
Nevertheless, the cases quoted are representative of the trend in the
United States to impose fiduciary obligations on dominant or
majority stockholders where they are exercising control over the
affairs of companies. In such cases, courts do not regard the
decision of the majority with deference, but, instead, apply
equitable principles and a test of intrinsic fairness to determine
whether a transaction should stand. 9 2 Dealings between corporations and majority stockholders are not prohibited, but courts
require that these meet a fairness standard. Under this standard, the
burden is on the parent corporation or majority stockholder to
prove, "subject to careful judicial scrutiny, that its transactions with
93
a subsidiary or a minority stockholder were objectively fair."
The American courts have had more occasions to consider the
problems of the majority's use of its power, when it has interests
90.
91.
92.
93.
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which are in conflict with those of the corporation, than our courts
have had. Given the common equity tradition shared by both
countries, it is not improbable that our courts would eventually
reach similar results. It is clear that our courts are not content to let
the majority rule in all cases, but they have failed to develop a
consistent set of principles which would allow one to predict when
they are likely to set aside the will of the majority. It is not
particularly useful to rely on such indefinite concepts as "fraud on
the minority" as a guideline to intervention. The distinction made
between class votes and other votes of shareholders has, if anything,
served to confuse the issue of majority rights and there seems little
to commend it. Shareholders will differ on many occasions as to the
course which a corporation should follow and there is every reason
to allow the majority will to prevail if that will has been exercised
with a view to the advancement of the common interests of
shareholders. When the majority has an extraneous interest, courts
have viewed, and will undoubtedly continue to view, their decisions
with scepticism, and will themselves consider the fairness of the
transactions in question. It would be useful if this principle, which
is the underlying principle in British American v. O'Brien, was
established as one of general application in all cases of
shareholders' votes. It would also be helpful if the courts declared
that, where a shareholder, either alone or with others, is in a
position to direct the management of a corporation, he occupies a
fiduciary position towards the corporation in the exercise of such
powers. It is desirable that, in all cases where the action of a
majority with such extraneous interests is challenged, it should bear
the burden of establishing that its actions are fair to the corporation.
Even if such positions were taken by our courts, the problem of
challenging the actions of such minorities would not be an easy one.
IV. The OppressionRemedy
The Canada Business Corporations Act, as well as some provincial
legislation, provides security holders with a remedy against
oppressive conduct. 94 The remedy may be granted when:
(a) the powers of the directors of a corporation, or any of its
affiliates, are being exercised in a manner;
94. C.B.C.A., supra, s. 234, Business Corporations Act, S.M.C. 225; Business
Corporations Act, S.S. 1977, C. 10.
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(b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its
affiliates are being carried on in a manner; or
(c) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its affiliates
effects a result
that is "oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly
disregards the interests of any security holder." The court is given a
broad power to make such orders as it sees fit, including orders for
an investigation, appointing a receiver, amending the articles or
by-laws, replacing directors, requiring the securities of a complainant to be purchased, varying or setting aside transactions, and
compensating aggrieved persons. Section 235 provides that, in any
such application, the action shall not be stayed by reason only that it
is shown that the alleged breach of a duty owed to the corporation
may be, or has been, approved by the shareholders of such body
corporate, although this may be taken into account by the court in
determining whether to make an order.
Thus, the court is given a very wide-ranging power to right
almost any conceivable wrong suffered by a shareholder, and, in
giving a remedy, need not be bound by the long-held distinction
between rights enjoyed by a shareholder and rights enjoyed and only
enforceable by the corporation. Also, the court may act even when
the course of conduct complained of is an isolated act, rather than a
continuing course of oppressive conduct; this approach is a broader
one than section 210 of the U. K. Companies Act 1948, which
served as a model for the legislation, as, under that section, relief
was limited to cases where there was a continuing course of
conduct. 9 5 The object of the legislation was to avoid the necessity of
a winding-up order in cases of a substantial abuse of majority
power, while giving a remedy that would offer continuing relief or
96
indemnity to the complainant.
It is too early to tell what use the courts will make of these very
broad powers, but there is some indication that they will use them
liberally whenever convinced that a shareholder has been unfairly
treated. In Re Peterson v. Kanata Investments Ltd., 97 Tay J.
appointed a receiver manager when a shareholder took control of a
corporation by threatening to suspend financial assistance to it
unless the board created a new class of shares which effectively
95. Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, supra, p. 163.
96. Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, supra, p. 164.
97. Peterson v. KanataInvestments Ltd. (1975) 60 D.L.R. (3d) 527.

Corporate Governance and Minority Rights 79

gave him control. On receiving such shares, the shareholder agreed
with a group, which was attempting a take-over of the corporation's
principal subsidiary, to vote the corporation's shares of the
subsidiary to support the take-over. The shareholder also proposed
to cause the corporation to be wound-up, which would have resulted
in the other shareholders receiving considerably less than their
invested capital. The court found that his method of obtaining
control was not bona fide and that the price of the shares issued to
him as a result of his demand was inordinately low. 98 The court also
found that the sale proposal and the threat of winding-up were
unfairly prejudicial because the other shareholders might have "a
genuine and practical desire" to hold the shares of the subsidiary; it
did not find that the agreed price for the sale of the subsidiary's
shares was too low, or that the sale agreement was made in bad
faith. The court ordered the controlling shareholder to sell the shares
issued to him back to the corporation at their original cost, so that a
new and independent board could be elected. 9 9 It is interesting that
the court was prepared to act to restrain the disposition of a
corporate asset even though it was not satisfied that there was
anything unfair in this aspect of the transaction. This is a major
interference with the ordinary right of a majority to determine what
is in the business interest of the corporation, and appears to
recognize an interest of individual shareholders in the retention of a
profit-making asset. Undoubtedly, the conduct of the controlling
shareholder in securing control by what the court regarded as unfair
tactics was a major factor in the decision, but the decision does
indicate a substantial willingness on the part of the court to
intervene broadly.
The decision in Redekop v. Robco Construction Ltd. 10 0 also
indicates a liberal approach to the legislation in a case involving a
conflict of interest. The majority shareholder of Robco received
shares in another corporation as a result of his position. As a
shareholder and director of both, he caused Robco to agree to carry
on its construction business for the new company's account at a
fixed price. Despite a lack of evidence of loss, the court held that
the majority shareholder was aiding himself with the use of Robco's
assets and, ultimately, at the expense of Robco's shareholders, and
98. Ibid, p. 544 et seq.
99. Ibid, p. 545.
100. Redekop v. Robco ConstructionLtd. (1978) 89 D.L.R. (3d) 507.
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concluded that, as this conduct was oppressive, he should account
for all profits and, in addition, should buy the complainant's shares.
Thus, any breach of a director's duties, whether or not it results in
loss to the corporation, may be actionable through the oppression
remedy. The power has even been used in Diligenti v. RWMD
Operations Kelowna Ltd.' 0 1 to give relief where a shareholder
complained about his removal from his company's management, on
the ground that this was "unfairly prejudicial" to the shareholder as
the defendant company was effectively a "quasi-partnership". In
Re Sabex InternationaleLtee., 102 a Quebec court used the section to
restrain the board of directors from issuing shares which would lead
to a dilution of the position of the existing shareholders, unless they
subscribed for new shares. This was done on the ground that such a
rights offering would unfairly prejudice the shareholders' equitable
rights within the meaning of section 234. In Jackman v. Jackets
Enterprises Limited,103 the court ordered the majority shareholder
to give a personal guarantee of a loan and pay for excessive interest
obligations which the court believed had been incurred.
Thus, the oppression remedy does give the court a very wide
power to afford relief when it believes that the complainant has been
unfairly dealt with, without being circumscribed in its relief by a
rigid set of rules. It is too early to tell whether the courts will make
extensive use of these very wide powers or will shy away from
interference which they believe would excessively circumscribe the
power of the majority to take the corporation in whatever direction it
believes to be in its business interests. There is no doubt, however,
that courts are becoming increasingly aware of the disparate
bargaining power of various segments of society and are inclined to
find methods to relieve against what they regard as unfairness
leading to unjust results.
The very breadth of the section leads to problems for both
majority and minority shareholders. For the minority shareholder,
the remedy requires a resort to litigation with all of its uncertainties.
Although the court has the right under section 235(4) to make an
order for interim costs, including legal fees and disbursements, the
complainant may ultimately be held accountable for such interim
costs upon a final disposition of the matter. Accordingly, the
101. Diligenti v. RWMD OperationsKelowna Ltd. (1977) 4 B.L.R., p. 134.
102. Re SabexInternationaleLtee. (1979) 6 B.L.R., p. 65.
103. Jackman v. Jackets EnterprisesLimited (1977) 4 B.C.L.R., p. 358.
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procedure is certainly not without risk, and the prospect of a long
trial and the possible exhaustion of all appeal procedures by the
majority will constitute a substantial deterrent in most cases. For the
majority shareholder, the procedure also involves a considerable
risk because the only real limitation on the power of the court is
imposed by the requirement that it must find conduct which, in its
view, is unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly disregards the interests
of, any security holder. Undoubtedly, as the law is developed by a
series of actions and appeals, the position of both groups will
become much clearer. However, the resolution of such matters by a
prolonged litigious process, governed by little or nothing in the way
of guidelines, leaves something to be desired, although such a
remedy unquestionably will make a real contribution to the fair
treatment of shareholders.
V. FundamentalChanges
The authors of the Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law
for Canada concluded that the common law governing the conduct
of majority shareholders in cases where fundamental changes were
being made was unsatisfactory.10 4 Accordingly, they recommended
that, instead of relying on common law standards to govern the
conduct of majority shareholders, a right should be conferred upon a
shareholder who dissents, upon the making of a fundamental
change, to opt out of the corporation and demand fair compensation
for his shares.' 0 5 Their view was that this right, instead of placing
the minority shareholder at the mercy of the majority, would permit
him to withdraw from the enterprise where the majority was able to
obtain the requisite special resolution. They believed that this would
allow the majority shareholders to effect almost any fundamental
change with impunity. In their opinion, "the result is a resolution of
a problem that protects minority shareholders from discrimination
and at the same time preserves flexibility within the enterprise,
06
permitting it to adapt to a changing business condition." 1
These recommendations were substantially adopted in Part IV of
the Canada Business Corporations Act. The result is that all
significant changes in the articles affecting shares or the nature of
the business to be carried on, amalgamations, continuances under
104. Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, supra, p. 114.
105. Ibid, p. 115.
106. Ibid, p. 115.
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the laws of other jurisdictions and sales, and leases or exchanges of
all or substantially all of the property of the corporation give rise to
a right of dissent. In addition, section 170 confers on a shareholder
of a class or series an extensive right to vote separately as a class
upon proposals to amend the articles where his rights are affected.
One salutory aspect of this change was to exclude the effect of such
decisions as Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Limited, White v.
Bristol Aeroplane Co., and re John Smith's Tadcaster Brewery
Company, 107 so that shareholders are entitled to have such a class
vote not only where their rights are altered directly, but also in many
cases where there is an indirect effect upon those rights as a result of
action in respect of the shares of another class.
Despite these improvements, it is questionable whether the
statutory provisions as to fundamental changes and, in particular,
the appraisal remedy constitute as great a protection for the rights of
minority as the draftsmen believed. For example, under the
provisions of section 170(1), it is possible to draft articles so that the
right to a class vote is excluded where the fundamental change alters
the maximum number of shares, where it cancels, exchanges, or
reclassifies shares, or where it adds, changes, or removes rights
attached to shares. All of these measures, of course, may radically
alter the position of a shareholder who may well have acquired
shares without any considered examination of the articles. It also
may be questionable whether the legislation has successfully
avoided a not uncommon method of diluting a shareholder's voting
position by splitting another class of shares. It has been suggested
that, although the share split itself would require an amendment of
the articles, a class vote of the shares diluted would probably not be
required unless the company's articles provided for a maximum
number of shares of the class being divided and that class were
found to have rights or privileges equal or superior to those of the
diluted class. 10 8 Furthermore, the provisions as to fundamental
changes do not provide any statutory code as to when shareholders
within a class who have conflicting interests with those of the class
may vote to advance their own interests. Unless an application is
made to a court to enjoin such shareholders, they are free to vote.
107. Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Limited, supra; White v. Bristol Aeroplane
Co., [1953] Ch. 65, and Re John Smith's TadcasterBreivery Company, [1953] Ch.

308.
108. Mary Ann Waldron The Protection of Preference Shareholders in a Closely
Held Corporation,4 Canadian Business Law Journal, 29 at p. 41.
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Also, it must be recognized that some fundamental changes to the
business of a corporation are not considered to be "fundamental
changes" within the meaning of the legislation. For example, a
right to dissent applies upon the sale, etc., of all or substantially all
of the property of a corporation other than in the ordinary course of
business. This still leaves a majority shareholder free to make
sweeping changes in the business of a corporation without creating
dissent rights. This comment is not meant to suggest that every
major change in a company's affairs should require shareholder
approval; rather, it is suggested that the very broad powers which a
majority can still exercise free of dissent rights require that, when it
exercises control over the affairs of a company, it should be subject
to fiduciary obligations.
In many cases, the effectiveness of the appraisal remedy will
determine whether the position of the minority is adequately
protected. A detailed examination of the appraisal remedy is beyond
the scope of this paper, but its effectiveness as a remedy is open to
question. Its exercise involves embarking on a complex litigious
procedure, the outcome of which may be very uncertain and very
much delayed. The shareholder may, if the court believes it right to
do so, be awarded costs, but at the commencement of the process he
cannot be certain of this. He will be forced to end his participation
in the corporation and he can be certain that, at the end of the day,
he will be visited by a tax collector intent upon gathering capital
gains tax, and, accordingly, he will certainly lose part of the earning
power of his investment. Even after he has obtained what he regards
as a satisfactory order, he may find that the corporation is precluded
from making payment because it is insolvent. 10 9 In circumstances
where he has some question about the viability of the corporation as
a result of the course adopted by its controlling elements, he may
regard this as a real risk impelling him to take what he can get at
once. Also, the process of arriving at fair value is a complex one,
frequently involving substantial delays.
In determining the fair value to be awarded, the court may
consider a number of factors, including the market value, the net
asset value, the investment value, and the value arrived at by a
discontinued cash flow analysis. In Re Wall & Redekop
0 a case arising under
Corporation,11
section 228 of the Companies
109. C.B.C.A., supra, section 184 (26).
110. Re Wall& Redekop Corporation(1975) 1 W.W.R., 621.
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Act, 1973 (B.C.), McFarlane J. held that he was not persuaded that
the "fair value" of shares could be determined by the stock market
price of the shares when management held two-thirds of the shares
and the stock was very thinly traded. Relying on American
authorities, he found that:
There are at least three ways of determining the fair value of
shares in any given corporation. That value may be determined
by reference to the market value of the shares in the stock
exchange, by calculating the net asset value, or the amount to be
obtained upon a hypothetical liquidation, or the investment value
of the shares based on a capitalization of the earnings of the
company. 1 1 '
After declaring that "whatever method is employed the dissenting
shareholder is to be paid for his proportionate interest in the
company as a going concern", he left the actual determination to a
referee. 112

In Neonex International Ltd. v. Kolasa, et al,1 Bouck J.
considered the effect of section 184 of the C.B.C.A. in a case
involving an amalgamation by which the minority were to be
squeezed out of the company for cash or redeemable preference
shares. The shareholders asked for the appointment of an appraiser.
Bouck J. refused to make such an order, saying that:
It might be appropriate where a company had only one easily
appraised piece of property. It is not suitable for this kind of
complaint due to the complex nature of the operations of Neonex.
Many practical problems come to mind . . . For example, who

would pay the cost of the appraiser during the course of such an
inquiry? Costs are a creature of statute and not of the common
law. An appraiser could take months or years conducting an
investigation. Generally speaking the rules and procedure of this
court only allow an award of costs at the conclusion of a
proceeding. They cannot be advanced part way through to help
finance the other side's claim or defence.
Nothing could better underline the difficulties of the dissenting
shareholder than this exposition of the problems involved in fixing
the value of shares. The dissenting shareholder, in the case of any
complex corporation, will be faced with a well-prepared case by the
corporation and will need to arm himself with experienced advisors,
both legal and financial, if he is to have any hope of success. As
111. Ibid, pp. 625-6.
112. Ibid, p. 628.
113. Neonex InternationalLtd. v. Kolasa, etal (1978) 2 W.W.R. p. 593.
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Bouck J. said, the task may take years; in the meantime, his
investment is locked into an enterprise with which he is dissatisfied.
The risks of such a venture are likely to deter anyone other than the
shareholder with a substantial interest. In the Neonex case, Bouck J.
ordered a trial, although he did order that the burden of proof of the
fair value of the offer should be placed upon the petitioner. The
complainant, nevertheless, was left with the problem of valuation,
which the judge recognized to be a complex task. Bouck J.
concluded that the value might be fixed by taking the market value,
the net asset value, the investment value, or a combination of all
three. The shareholder must have concluded that his application was
only the first step on a long road.
The provisions of section 184 of the C.B.C.A. were considered
in Montgomery v. Shell Canada Ltd., 1 14 a case involving a dissent
by shareholders upon the creation of a new class of preferred shares
ranking in priority to theirs. In that case, Shell offered a figure
based on the weighted average of closing stock exchange prices
during the one-month period prior to the vote. A very small minority
of the outstanding shares refused to accept the offer. Estey J. held
that the fair value of Shell shares was $16.50, measured by the
market value. No effort had been made to put forward investment
value as representing "fair value", and Estey J. declined to accept
the applicant's evidence of net asset value on the ground that this
was an inappropriate method when a corporation was to continue as
a going concern. 1 15 He did conclude that the market price of Shell
stock had not been significantly depressed because a majority of its
shares was held by a single shareholder, finding that there was a
sufficient volume of trading to indicate that the market value was an
appropriate test as to the price at which shareholders were prepared
to buy and sell the shares. Very different results were reached in Re
Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd., 116 where a very substantial part of
the outstanding shares was held by a small number of shareholders,
and shares were not actively traded. McEachem C.J.S.C. rejected
market value as an appropriate test, having regard to the relatively
thin trading, the generally pessimistic nature of the information
released to the public about the company, and the failure to pay
dividends. He also was unimpressed by the acceptance of the offer
114. Montgomery v. Shell CanadaLtd. (1980) 10 B.L.R., p. 261.
115. Ibid, pp. 275-6.
116. Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd. (1980) 10 B.L.R., p. 113.
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by the overwhelming number of eligible shareholders, finding that
this was the result of pessimistic annual reports and opinions
expressed in the directors' circular as to value, which he found
unsatisfactory. In this case, each side had put forward evaluations
based on a discounted cash flow analysis; using this approach, the
judge fixed the fair value of the shares for the commercially viable
properties held by the company and an assigned value in respect of
the future potential of other properties held by it.
The market value of shares was once again rejected as
constituting "fair value" for the purposes of section 184 of the
C.B.C.A., in Domglas Inc. v. Jarislowski, Fraser & Co. " 7 The
Domglas case arose out of an amalgamation which effectively
eliminated minority shareholders. Greenberg J. reviewed a
substantial number of American authorities, concluding that one
could adopt a market value approach, a net asset value or an
investment value approach, or some combination of all of these.
While Domglas shares had been listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange for a number of years, the public float had been very
small and trading was very thin. He rejected the net asset value
approach, stating that:
The Canadian jurisprudence reviewed . . . although it placed

primary emphasis on the earnings method, reserves as well a role
for net asset values. The basic concept currently accepted by
valuation theorists is that a business is worth only what it can earn
except where it is worth less on a going concern basis than the
amount that would be realized if it were liquidated. 118
Greenberg J. concluded that, because the procedure was equivalent
to an expropriation, the fair value must include a premium for
forceable taking and should not be subject to a minority discount. 119
In addition to the problems outlined, questions can arise in
determining fair value as to what effect should be given to tax
advantages to be gained as a result of the transaction or whether tax
20
liabilities should be taken into account in preparing the valuation. 1
Thus, no general rule can be established as to what valuation
method a court will find acceptable in a particular case, but, rather,
the method chosen will depend upon the facts of the case.
117. Domglas Inc. v. Jarislowski Fraser& Co. (1980) S.C. 925.
118. Ibid, p. 953.
119. Ibid, p.p. 965-6.
120. Re Ripley InternationalLtd. (1977) 1 D.L.R. 269, at p. 273; Redekop v.
Robco Construction Ltd. (1980) 3 A.C.W.S. 408; Re VCS Holdings Ltd. (1978) 5
W.W.R. 559; Re Diligenti v. RWMD Operations, etc. (1977) 4 B.C.L.R. 134.
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This examination of the appraisal right is intended only to
illustrate that it is not a simple remedy. Many shareholders will
conclude that their interests will be better served by having their
money quickly than by engaging in a piece of litigation involving a
substantial expenditure on their part and an outlay for substantial
costs which may or may not be recovered. At a minimum,
legislation should require that interest will be payable, rather than
12 1
leaving this question to the discretion of the court, as it is now.
The legislation should also provide that the court may, upon any
application to it to fix the fair value, make an order at the outset
requiring the corporation to pay reasonable legal fees and expert
fees incurred by the dissenting shareholder in connection with the
proceeding. However, even if these changes were made, a
shareholder is unlikely to resort to the remedy unless he has a very
substantial investment, and even then he may be prepared to take
less than might be awarded as fair value in the interests of speed and
certainty. The small shareholder is most unlikely to resort to the
courts. Thus, although the remedy may be useful in some cases, its
existence does not ensure fair treatment of minorities or any
assurance that fundamental changes will be made with a view only
to the interests of the body of shareholders, rather than to the
interests of the majority.
VI. Conclusion
The development of the law, both by the courts and by statute,
indicates that a fairness standard is being adopted as the appropriate
one for considering the treatment of minorities by majorities. There
will always be some difference of opinion as to the degree to which
courts should interfere in the internal management of corporations
and what the appropriate balance should be between protecting
minorities and allowing the majority's will to prevail. It should be
recognized that this is not simply an issue involving shareholders,
but, rather, the whole of society, as the corporation is the means by
which much of the nation's economic activity is organized. Once
this interest is recognized, the appropriate question becomes what
type of regime will best permit corporations to marshall the savings
of society for these economic activities. It seems apparent that
whenever minorities are, in a broad sense, treated unfairly, such
treatment constitutes a detriment to the effective working of the
121. C.B.C.A.,supra, section 184 (23).
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capital markets. It has long been recognized that society has an
interest in having an effective capital market which ensures a full
and fair disclosure of all the facts material to a decision to purchase
a security. Thus, it has been recognized that the public interest
requires a fair system for trading in securities. Equally, the public
interest should dictate that companies will be managed so as to
advance the common interests of all shareholders and not the special
interests of a few.
If this is a legitimate conclusion, then it is doubtful whether the
existing methods of securing a requisite degree of fairness to
shareholders are adequate. Our courts will, in all probability, slowly
but surely use the common law and the new statutory remedies to
impose a system which requires a high degree of fair dealing when
majority shareholders impose their will on minorities, and will be
astute to restrain actions by majorities dictated by interests
extraneous to those of the whole body of shareholders. However,
this progress has, in the past, been painfully slow and will depend
upon a case-by-case development by way of a costly litigious
process. It must be recognized that shareholders are loath to resort
to litigation, even when they have some assurance that crippling
costs will not be imposed upon them. In many cases, even the
largest shareholders are content to accept settlements which fall
short of what fairness might dictate and what might be achieved if
one were content to await the outcome of litigation. Accordingly, a
majority shareholder can take advantage of such a situation and
secure results which fall far short of what are ideal if the objective is
to have all shareholders treated fairly. Given these realities, it would
seem preferable to anticipate this slow development process and
enact some rules now which would make it more difficult for
majorities to mistreat minorities. When a majority exercises a power
to direct the course which a corporation will follow, it is surely
desirable that this power be subject to the overriding consideration
that it must act fairly.
We have no trouble in imposing fiduciary obligations on the
agents and officers of corporations, believing that those who have a
duty to act for others should exercise the utmost good faith in the
performance of such duties. By the combined force of statutes and
the development of the common law, the same standards are
required of directors. There seems to be every reason for applying
similar standards to controlling or dominant shareholders who, in
practice, exercise ultimate control over both officers and directors.
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These standards can co-exist with the principle that the majority has
a right to govern, but they will ensure that the governance will be
directed to furthering the interest of the corporation. When the
governing shareholder has interests opposed to those of the
corporation, his right to dictate the course to be followed should be
subject to the overriding principle that the power may be exercised
only in the interest of the corporation.
The reality of the present position is that, although the courts may
impose a standard of fairness on dominant shareholders, the burden
of enforcement falls on the protesting shareholders. A right is only
useful when it can be practically exercised; if it cannot be enforced
readily, it will be breached by all those who are more interested in
their own advancement than in questions of equity. Unfortunately,
in an increasingly complex society we are finding that, although the
courts may be an admirable method of resolving disputes, the right
to find relief there does not always result in citizens enjoying the
protection the law affords them. What is needed is a system which
results in respect for the rights society believes to be worthy of
protection, so that citizens need not resort to the courts for relief.
Thus, society has, more and more, resorted to administrative
tribunals, regulation, and the substantial restriction of freedom of
contract by statute, in an effort to ensure fair treatment whenever it
is recognized that there is an inequality of bargaining power. Recent
efforts to afford consumers greater protection are an illustration of
society's ultimate response when it believes a system is working
unjustly. Such initiatives, it is suggested, would be an undesirable
response to this problem, as there is certainly merit in the traditional
view that shareholders normally are the best judges of their own
interest. Indeed, a detailed statutory or regulatory scheme for the
governance of corporations is unlikely to be more successful than
many of society's attempts to regulate complex and rapidly
changing events. A more promising approach, it is suggested,
would be to create a regime where the burden is placed on
dominating shareholders to show that their actions are fair to the
corporations whose destinies they control and where their votes will
not have the ultimate power of decision whenever they have
interests opposed to or competing with the corporations they
control. If dominating shareholders were faced with this onus and
the further onus of seeking court approval for major transactions out
of the ordinary course of business involving self-dealing, and for
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fundamental changes where they, in effect, were on both sides of
the table, many dubious transactions would never be attempted.
In developing such rules, it must be recognized that there is a
danger of the tyranny of the minority, as it would be most
unfortunate to have a system in which a small minority could
effectively stalemate a corporation and "blackmail" the other
shareholders. The objective must be to ensure fair treatment, while,
at the same time, not stalemating the business of the corporation.
Such a goal could be attained by making the court the final arbiter
when a majority has an interest extraneous to its shareholder
interest.
A better balance might be achieved if legislation was enacted,
adopting these principles:
(a) directors having a conflict should not be entitled to vote and
the existing rule as to the voting by directors in transactions
involving affiliates should be repealed, save in situations where
the matter at issue involves wholly owned subsidiaries;
(b) directors and dominant shareholders may only exploit
opportunities in which their corporations have been or are
interested if their actions are disclosed to the shareholders and
approved by independent directors after full disclosure;
(c) a dominant shareholder and his associates should be regarded
as having a fiduciary obligation to the corporation, so that the
exercise of their power to control the corporation and its
management would be subject to a standard of fairness
comparable to that imposed by the American courts;
(d) shareholders should only be entitled to vote at general
shareholders' meetings or class meetings with court approval
when they have interests which affect the matter at issue and
which are in conflict with those of the corporation or with those
of the class;
(e) a corporation or a dominant shareholder should have the right
to apply to a court for approval of any action in respect of which
shareholders are disenfranchised because of extraneous interests;
(f) whenever shareholders are disenfranchised because of such a
conflict, the balance of the shareholders should be entitled to
approve the transaction in question;
(g) all material transactions between such a shareholder and a
corporation which are out of the corporation's ordinary course of
business should be submitted either to a court or to a meeting of
shareholders for approval;
(h) in any action involving the propriety of a transaction between
such a shareholder and the corporation, the onus should be on the
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shareholder to establish that the transaction was in the best
interests of the corporation;
(i) the court should be entitled to make an order at the
commencement of an appraisal proceeding, directing that any
shareholder exercising the appraisal remedy be paid all
reasonable costs and expenses regardless of success.
The object of these proposals is to require a much greater
independent scrutiny of matters where the interests of the dominant
shareholder differ from those of the corporation or the interests of
the class of shareholders affected by some fundamental change. The
prohibition against a director voting when the matter at issue relates
to an affiliate which is not wholly owned should ensure that
transactions between a parent and such affiliates will be sanctioned
by independent directors. This may not be a completely effective
solution; as has been noted elsewhere in this paper, independence
may be a rare quality in some directors. Yet, it does not seem
reasonable to require shareholder approval of all such transactions
when many parents and subsidiaries are vertically integrated, so that
they do business together in the ordinary course. Generally
speaking, it is easier to judge the fairness of such transactions
because, in many cases, they involve business transactions carried
out at arm's length on a fairly regular basis, so that an adequate
standard of comparison exists. Accordingly, a requirement that all
such material transactions and their terms should be disclosed on a
regular basis should go a considerable distance towards ensuring
fairness. Transactions outside the normal course of business present
an entirely different type of problem, as often there is no bench
mark by which to judge them and frequently they are more
complex. It seems appropriate that all such transactions should be
ratified, for if independent shareholders cannot be persuaded of
their value, their validity is probably questionable. However, there
is clearly the danger in such a system that a shareholder with a
miniscule interest will seize on the opportunity to "hold up" the
corporation by exacting a price for his consent. Unfortunately,
majorities have no monopoly on the tendency to advance their own
interests unfairly in some cases. Accordingly, it is suggested that
the corporation always have the right to apply to a court as the final
arbiter in the same way as is done in the case of reorganizations.
These proposals, if adopted, will not introduce any millennium,
as there will always be difficulties in resolving differences between
majorities and minorities, both in corporate governance and in life.
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Their adoption, however, would clarify the obligations of those
who, in many cases, are the real managers of our public
corporations. There will always be different views as to what these
obligations are. Nevertheless, the public interest in the effective
workings of the corporate sector should be better served by
requiring that the interests of the corporation be preferred to those of
the majority than by leaving a majority free to pursue its own
interests when they conflict with those of the corporation.

